

STAT

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80M00772A000300020047-5

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80M00772A000300020047-5

Alchono


DCI/IC-78-0039
July 10, 1978

The Honorable Barry Goldwater
427 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Barry:

I thank you for the concern and good wishes expressed in your recent letter to me. I appreciate the amount of time you have spent considering the reorganization of the Intelligence Community and I am grateful for your candor in expressing your doubts to me about my proposal. Let me try to dispel those doubts as best I can.

I share your distaste for the creation of large, new bureaus. I sincerely hope that in proposing this reorganization I am not bringing about the birth of such a creature. I intend to control the size of the Intelligence Community staff; it may grow slightly in the next year or so beyond the level I requested for Fiscal Year 1979, but any such growth will be highly visible and will require strong justification to me and to the Congress. I will expect my deputies to demonstrate to me that they are using their manpower as efficiently as possible, and I expect in turn to have to demonstrate that to you. STAT



Why did I feel the reorganization was necessary? Let me consider both parts:

1. The Resource Management group, in my view, did a competent job of putting together the first real NFIP budget, that for FY 1979, and supported me adequately in defending that budget before OMB and the Congress. But, to be frank, that staff was not able to do anywhere near enough evaluation and analysis to convince me that I was making decisions on the budget and program that were as well informed as I wanted them to be. It did not provide sufficient capability independent of the program managers, contractors, and other interested parties to support the choices I had to make. Furthermore, it was not sufficient to carry out the budget execution responsibilities which I acquired with the promulgation of Executive Order 12036. In assessing the size of this staff against the requirements, it is also important to realize that responses to congressional committees place important demands upon this staff's resources. A large fraction of the analyses and evaluations that were done in the last year were mandated by Congress. I think by and large these were worthwhile studies to undertake, but they allowed little margin of staff time for evaluation aimed specifically at the decisions I had to make. So I feel comfortable in asking for some augmentation of staff to support these activities.
2. Collection Tasking. The collection tasking activities were carried out by three organizations: COMIREX was really managing tasking and allocation of a very valuable resource. They were deeply involved in the nuts and bolts of systems operation. Nearly three quarters of the staff involved in collection tasking worked for COMIREX. The SIGINT Committee was one step removed from actual operations. They provided broad direction and systems studies to support the SIGINT system. The Human Resources Committee was very small. It did some evaluation, and was involved in the setting of a small number of broad priorities. Thus, the activities of these three groups were quite different. There was some real tasking done by COMIREX and some guidance for detailed tasking provided by the SIGINT Committee but there were no overall plans made for collection against specific intelligence problems. No one person was responsible for planning the operation of the collection systems taken as a whole and no one was accountable for their performance. In my plan I would add staff to do collection plans and to evaluate the operational performance of collection systems and mixes of collection systems measured against various intelligence problems.

Since the tasks of resource management and collection tasking were growing and were so different, it was my judgment that it was best to split the Intelligence Community Staff to reflect the differences.

To a large extent, as your letter suggests, the Collection Tasking Staff will be manned by people on loan from various Intelligence Community entities. It is also important to note that this proposal was accomplished without any change in the financing requested for the NFIP. The billets were shifted from CIA and DoD. Overall, budgets and manpower remained fixed.

I share your concern that we not overreact to the revelation of intelligence abuses in the past. Although I hope these abuses don't recur, this reorganization is not aimed at solving that problem. Rather, it is aimed at executing the management responsibilities which E.O. 12036 levied upon me. I am not certain overall that the structure is exactly right or that the numbers are precisely those required. It is really not possible before the shakedown cruise to make such judgments. But you can rest assured that I will give you a report on the shakedown and that I will be striving to my utmost to prevent this staff from growing out of control.

Sincerely,

STANSFIELD TURNER

Distribution:

Orig. - Adsee.

1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - OLC
1 - OPBD/RMS
1 - D/DCI/RM
1 - RM Registry
1 - D/DCI/CT

D/DCI/RM/
(10 July 1978)

STAT

STAT

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80M00772A000300020047-5

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80M00772A000300020047-5

BARRY GOLDWATER
ARIZONA

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80M00772A000300020047-5

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

June 22, 1978

COMMITTEES:

ARMED SERVICES
TACTICAL AIR POWER SUBCOMMITTEE
INTELLIGENCE SUBCOMMITTEE
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SUBCOMMITTEE
COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SPACE
AVIATION
COMMUNICATIONS
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
VICE CHAIRMAN

Executive Registry

78-5875

Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Stan:

This letter is being written to you after long thought and consideration about your proposed IC Staff Reorganization and what it will mean and require.

Before getting into that, however, I'd like to make a comment to you that I think must remain in the minds of everyone connected with our intelligence gathering agencies. All of the so-called black marks or black eyes, if you want to call them that, registered against these agencies over the past four or five years have not and I repeat this emphatically, have not been caused by decisions originating with the agencies. Every single instance of abuse which has been disclosed to the American public and the eyes of the world has emanated from the White House under both Republican and Democrat Presidents. Please remember that in any thinking that you go through relative to your new job.

Having said that, my next remark is that, while there may have been minor discrepancies in the operations of the intelligence agencies, the record also tells us that they have operated efficiently and well and I think they still do. Ours is still the finest intelligence gathering system in the world.

Now, to return to the proposition that you have asked us to approve. I have to admit that I am inclined to yield to you because I want to see you successful, but I think you should be forewarned of probable difficulties. What you are asking for, in reality, is the start of another

Admiral Stansfield Turner
June 22, 1978
Page Two

bureau. And, I have been here too long to think for one moment that any sunset clause is going to be applied to your suggestion with any effectiveness. What will happen is that you will start off, if we approve it, with this rather small group and over the years it will grow and grow. The first thing you know there will be another building. I use the word advisedly because, in my years of experience in this town you never start a small group without its growing into an immense one with at least one building and a permanency that is more certain than the sun's rising in the east.

And, after much pause and reflection, I think the most prudent course would be to accept the idea of a small staff until the new organization has had its shake-down cruise.

First, I see no need nor can I understand how you can argue for new leaders with no experience in the fields we all are interested in. As for the staffs they would head, I see no reason why you can't do it by just moving people from the different agencies to the points you want them to occupy as you have outlined for us. Now, in doing this moving, I think you have to pay full respect to where the heads of the different agencies really feel they can lose those people. If they can't give people up and keep the high quality of their components, then you can do it either by promotion or, as a last resort, by new people.

STAT
STAT
STAT
You have asked for [] people in the Resource Management Staff and, frankly, I think this may be too many and I think the [] that our staff has recommended is too many, but I don't think it is a matter of great importance. But, when we get into the Collection Tasking Staff, you have asked for [] new positions totaling [] which our staff has reduced down to [] I can see absolutely no need for the number and size of the different tasking groups such as HUMINT, SIGINT and PHOTINT. Now, if you

STAT
STAT

Admiral Stansfield Turner

June 22, 1978

Page Three

are going to assign each of the different groups that you plan on the forces that will take care of the different regions of the world plus a separate staff for these tasking groups, that's one way to go but, I really don't believe you have to do this. I think the present system is turning out the type intelligence through existing tasking that you would want and it is darn good as far as this particular person is concerned.

What I am trying to get at, Stan, is suggesting to you a way that will give you a start on what you seek, but not let you make the mistake that is so often made of trying to start off with the whole thing and having it collapse of its own weight. I believe the example that I can point to most poignantly now is Schlesinger's group on Energy. Over at DOE we have thousands of people with nothing to do and decisions are piling up by the hundreds with no indication that they will ever be worked on, thought about or granted. At the same time, the country continues to go down the drain in the field of energy.

I don't want to stand in your way because you are new at this job and you come with an extremely fine background of naval experience but on the other hand, I don't want you to fall into the Washington trap and wind up some day looking back at your "child" who will by then have grown into a monster and say, good God, that couldn't have been my doing. Please think about this. If you want to talk about it privately, fine; if you want more staff meetings I know they are interested in talking with you about it. What I am trying to say in a few words is, we have a heck of a good intelligence gathering system and I don't see any need for major changes in it. However, I think improvements in the machinery can be achieved and improved results can be achieved without a major shakeup that will result in a new bureaucracy.

In closing, let me again say to you, that the problems you inherited were problems created in the White House. If you can keep that in mind and keep a firm resolve never to

Admiral Stansfield Turner
June 22, 1978
Page Four

allow it to happen again, I think you will get everything you want in running the ship of intelligence and it can turn out to be as rewarding as running the ships of our fleet.

With best wishes,


Barry Goldwater